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COMMENT
STATUS OF PICKETING IN WASHINGTON
The history of the status of picketing in the eyes of the legislative
and judicial bodies of our nation since the early part of this decade
has been a vitally interesting one, mirroring the changes which have
taken place in the social and economic outlook of the populace. It is
the purpose of this article to present a brief survey of this history,
giving particular emphasis to that which has transpired in the state of
Washington.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The greatest individual event of this decade, so far as this particular
field of law is concerned, was the passage by Congress in 1932 of the
so-called Norris-LaGuardia Act.1 This legislative enactment, a result
of the growth of the labor movement's power and influence, provided
for injunctions against picketing only in those cases in which certain
facts existed, and provided for specific steps to be taken by the peti-
tioner before the decree could be granted. Further, it contained a pro-
vision 2 which was directed at obviating the results of the judicial con-
struction of the Clayton Act,2 as expressed in the famous case of
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering.4 This case had held that labor
legislation aimed at protecting picketers in cases of "labor disputes"
did not apply to those instances in which the plaintiff and defendant
did not occupy the relationship of employer and employee. This, of
course, cast dark shadows upon the horizon of labor, in that it left
picketers whose object in picketing was unionization of the employees
in an establishment at the mercy of the equity courts, if the picketers
were not employees of the plaintiff. The Duplex case therefore con-
stituted a serious deterrent to the process of organization of labor.
Labor realized that, as a practical matter, a great deal depended on its
right to picket employers as part of a unionization program, even if
the employees didn't join in the dispute actively, because of the fact
that the threat of losing his job in most cases would keep the employee
from openly expressing his desire to affiliate with the organized groups.
The labor movement therefore rejoiced in a victory when the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was passed, specifically stating that the term "labor
dispute" was not meant to be confined to instances of employer-em-
ployee relationships. Labor's hopes rose still further when various state
legislatures adopted laws of a tenor similar to that of the federal act.
The Washington legislature was quick to fall in line with this new atti-
tude toward the increasingly exuberant labor group, passing an act
closely akin to the federal law in 1933. 5 In this act, as in the federal
act, the right to enjoin picketing was removed from the jurisdiction of
the equity courts except when certain elements of unlawfulness, in-
ability to secure enforcement of rights by authorities, and attempts at
arbitration were present, and after compliance with specified procedural
requirements. Further, the term "labor dispute" was again given a
definition clearly intended to be very liberal, the law stating that the
term "labor dispute" was to include various named controversies "re-
gardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate rela-
tion of employer and employee." 6
As was to be expected, it was but a short while until avenues of
escape from the operation of such laws as those described above were
sought by employers who now found themselves deprived of a hitherto
readily obtainable and vitally effective weapon in the battle between
capital and labor.
The courts found that there were two bases relied on by those who
sought injunctions against picketers in spite of the newly passed laws.
'47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101-115 (1934).
2Id. § 113c.
'38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1934).
4254 U. S. 443 (1921).
'Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1933, c. 7.
'Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1933, c. 7, § 13.
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The first of these was the old Duplex case approach, namely, the asser-
tion that the term "labor dispute" excluded conflicts in which the dis-
putants did not occupy the employer-employee relationship. For the
courts to uphold such claims would, of course, take the teeth out of the
new laws so far as protection to labor organizations seeking to unionize
was concerned, since it would revive the interpretation which had been
such a thorn in the side of labor, and which was the very interpretation
which the terms of the more recent laws had obviously been intended
to render ineffective.
7
In 1935 the Washington court was presented with this question in
the case of Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union,8 and proceeded to
prick the balloon of hope which had been labor's since 1933 by holding
that the 1933 Act was inapplicable to non-employee picketers, the term
"labor dispute" not having been intended to include this type of con-
flict. It should be noted that in United Electric Coal Co. v. Rice9 and
Lauf v. Skinner,'0 .handed down in 1935 and 1936, respectively, the
position of the Washington court was supported by lower federal court
decisions. However, the great majority of state and federal decisions
involving this question, particularly the most recent decisions, have
not recognized the Duplex case interpretation of "labor dispute" ac-
cepted by the Washington court." It is interesting to find that the
earlier lower court's decision in Lauf v. Skinner was reversed in 1938
by the United States Supreme Court,'2 the new decision placing the
inclusive interpretation upon the term, as did New Negro Alliance v.
Sanitary Grocery Co."3 in the same year. In the New Negro Alliance
case the court really went much farther than the Washington court
would have had to go in the Safeway case to have found a dispute,
the factual situation in the former having been one in which an associa-
tion of colored persons requested a grocery store company to adopt a
policy of hiring negro clerks in its stores, and when the request was
refused, the association picketed the grocery company. The United
States Supreme Court held in that case that a labor dispute did exist.
To so hold is to place upon the term a much broader interpretation
than would have been necessary in the Safeway case, in which, at least,
-New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (1938);
American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A. General Local No. 200
of Milwaukee, 222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250 (1936). See Mason, The Limits
as to Effective Federal Control of the Employer-Employee Relationship
(1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 277.
'184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d) 372 (1935), (1936) 11 WASH. L. REV. 53.
080 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
'82 F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
"Cinderella Theater Co., Inc., v. Sign Writers' Local Union, 6 F. Supp.
164 (E. D. Mich. 1934); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v. Furniture Workers'
Industrial Union, 8 F. Supp. 209 (D. N. J. 1934); Schuster v. International
Assn. of Machinists, 293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50 (1937); Dehan v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Local, 159 So. 637 (La. App. 1935); Lichter-
man v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Driveks Union, 204 Minn. 75, 282 N. W.
689 (1938); Wallace Co. v. International Assn. of Mechanics, 155 Ore. 652,
63 P. (2d) 1090 (1936); American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A.
General Local No. 200 of Milwaukee, 222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250 (1936);
Senn v. Tile Layers' Protective Union, 222 Wis. 383, 268 N. W. 270 (1936).
"-303 U. S. 323 (1938).
11303 U. S. 552 (1938).
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the ultimate purpose of the picketing organization, a labor union, may
theoretically be said to have been the improvement of wages, hours,
and working conditions of the plaintiff's employees. The Washington
court, in adopting this method of avoiding the operation of the new
type of labor legislation in cases of this nature, is following a definite
minority view. It appears that in so holding, the court has overridden
the clearly expressed legislative intent, as embodied in the words "re-
gardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee".14 Although it is obvious that a literal
interpretation of the law may afford an opportunity for unconscionable
activities to take place in some instances, it is submitted that it is not
within the province of the court to subsitute its views in such matters in
the face of a clearly expressed legislative intent. If changes in statutory
wording are desired, it is for the legislature to make those changes.
A second line of attack upon the recent laws has been the constitu-
tional approach, with claims of unconstitutionality being presented
before many courts. In 1936 the Washington court found itself con-
fronted with such a claim in the case of Blanchard v. Golden Age Brew-
ery,1" and with three judges dissenting, held three sections 16 of the
1933 Act unconstitutional, basing its view upon the existence of an
inherent right in the court of equity to issue injunctions in labor dis-
putes. In this case, it may be noted, a labor dispute within the meaning
of the act was found to exist, employees of the defendant being involved.
The court said that the removal of jurisdiction over such cases, except
in the face of certain facts and after following a certain procedure, was
an unwarranted interference with equity's rights as guaranteed by the
state constitution,'1 7 which provides: "The superior court shall have
original jurisdiction in all cases in equity . . . Said courts and their
judges shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto.
review, certiorari, prohibition, and writs of habeas corpus .. ." Without
entering into a discussion of the constitutional question involved, it
should be pointed out that there were vigorous dissents on this point,
and that by holding as it did, the Washington court held contra to all
the other state courts in which the question had arisen and from the
federal courts wherein the constitutionality of such statutes had been
questioned. The unconstitutionality attacks against these laws have
been based on three principal grounds, namely, (1) a violation of the
due process clause,' 8 (2) a denial of equal protection of the law,19 and
"Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1933, c. 7, § 13.
1'188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397 (1936).
'"Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1933, c. 7, §§ 7, 8, 9.
"WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
' Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International Union, 358 Ill. 239, 193 N.
E. 112 (1934); Schuster v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 293 Ill. App.
177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50 (1937); Scofes v. Helmar, 205 Ind. 596, 187 N. E. 662
(1933); Local Union No. 26 v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E. (2d) 624 (1937);
Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of Silk Workers, 116 N. J. Eq.
146, 172 Atl. 551, 92 A. L. R. 1464 (1934).
"
5Schuster v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 293 Ill. App. 177, 12
N. E. (2d) 50 (1937); Local Union No. 26 v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E.
(2d) 624 (1937); Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n of Mechanics, 155 Ore.
652, 63 P. (2d) 1090 (1936); American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H.
of A. General Local No. 200 of Milwaukee, 222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250
(1936).
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(3) an unwarranted denial of equity's fundamental right to deal with
this type of subject matter by injunction. 20 It will be noted that in
every instance cited the constitutionality of these statutes, whether
identical to or very similar to our own statute, has been given the ap-
proval of the courts, whether state or federal, and that as of this date
our court has been the only one holding to the contrary.
Thus in the first two decisions arising under the 1933 law, the
Washington court very decisively emasculated the recent enactment
by the use of two effective methods, using both means to negative
what appears to have been the express intention of the legislative
enactment. But subsequent cases show that the attitude of the Wash-
ington court toward picketing has been modified in certain respects since
the Safeway and Blanchard decisions.
The year after the Blanchard case had been decided another decision
of the court with regard to the right of an employer to enjoin picketing
was made in the case of Kimbel v. Lumber and Saw Mill Workers'
Union.21 In this case the defendant union was attempting to unionize
the plaintiff's employees, several of whom already belonged to defendant
union. The pickets were employees of plaintiff, though they remained
at a considerable distanGe from plaintiff's place of business. No men-
tion at all was made of the 1933 Act, the court's refusal to enjoin
being based chiefly on the reasonable nature of defendant's demands
and the fact that the peaceful picketing was being done at a reasonable
distance. A reading of the case might have led one to believe that the
court was no longer going to consider the 1933 Act as operative in these
situations.
However, two years later the Washington court was again con-
fronted with a situation much like that found in the earlier Safeway-
case. In Adams v. Building Service Employees' Union21 the court
again found an outside union seeking to organize the workers in the
petitioner's place of business, using pickets to lend strength to the
battle. The opinion of the court in that case was both puzzling and
interesting. The Blanchard case was cited to show the unconstitu-
tionality of parts of the 1933 Act dealing with limitations upon the
court's injunctive powers in "labor disputes", and the court then went
on to cite the Safeway case to show that there was no labor dispute,
and that the 1933 Act was for that reason inapplicable to the case.
The decision leaves one in doubt as to whether the court regarded the
law as still operative or not, since the citation of the Safeway case was
certainly of no value if the law itself was of no validity.
Several months later the court handed down another opinion in a
2Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union, 6 F. Supp. 164(E. D. Mich. 1934); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284(C. C. A. 2d, 1934); In re Cleveland & S. Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198 (N. D.
Ohio 1935); Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International Union, 358 fI1. 239,
193 N. E. 112 (1934); Local Union No. 26 v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E.(2d) 624 (1937); Dehan v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Local, 159 So. 637(La. App. 1935); Aberdeen Rest. Corp. v. Gottfried, 158 Misc. 785, 285 N. Y.
Supp. 832 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n of Mechanics,
155 Ore. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090 (1936); American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T.
C. & H. of A. General Local No. 200 of Milwaukee, 222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W.
250 (1936).
=189 Wash 416, 65 P. (2d) 1066 (1937).
=197 Wash. 242. 84 P. (2d) 1021 (1938).
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very similar factual situation, Fornili v. Auto Mechanics' Union.2" In
this opinion the court regarded the situation in which the picketing is
done by an outside union as being governed by stare decisis, under the
rule of the Safeway case and the recent Adams case. In this case a
vigorous dissent pointed out the way in which our court is at variance
with the other courts of the country in its interpretation of the mean-
ing of "labor dispute".
Shortly thereafter the court handed down its decision in the case of
United Union Brewing Co. v. Dave Beck.2 4 This, too, was a case in-
volving activities by an outside union, including picketing, and once
more the term "labor dispute" was held to exclude that type of rela-
tionship, the court citing the Safeway case, the Adams case, and the
Fornili case to support this position.
It is interesting to note that in neither of the last two cases discussed
above was there any mention of the unconstitutionaliy of the 1933 Act,
as decreed in the Blanchard case. In both of them the opinions were
based upon the inapplicability of the 1933 Act, due to the absence of
labor disputes. Since the portions of the act which had been declared
unconstitutional were those which contained the "teeth" of the act.
without which the act would be little more thau an expression of policy,
one may well wonder over finding opinions which refer to the act as a
valid and subsisting part of the state's statutory law, in spite of a
former declaration to the effect that the law's most important parts were
unconstitutional. An act rendered void by being declared unconstitu-
tional cannot be revived by judicial decision.
Within but a few weeks after the United Union Brewing Co. case, the
Washington court handed down another decision which is of decided
importance in attempting to ascertain the exact status of picketing in
this state. In the case of Yakima v. Gorham- 5 a municipality had passed
an ordinance making picketing unlawful, except by employees who
had been employed three months or more at the place of business
picketed, and who had been so employed within sixty days of the period
in which the acts referred to were done. The appellant was a picket
who had been carrying a "sandwich sign" pronouncing the employer
unfair to organized labor, and although a member of a union whose
members had been discharged for their membership, he was not and
had never been an employee of the picketed employer. The appellant
alleged the unconstitutionality of the ordinance under which he was
arrested, and a divided court upheld his contention. In this decision the
majority opinion, written by a dissenting judge in the "labor dispute"
definition cases, left no doubt as to the legality of peaceful picketing
per se in this state. The opinion expressly overrules the previous cases
which had declared peaceful picketing illegal under all circumstances,G
or which had considered it legal only under arbitrary spatial limita-
-100 Wash. Dec. 240, 93 P. (2d) 422 (1939).
2'100 Wash. Dec. 412, 93 P. (2d) 772 (1939).
-1100 Wash. Dec. 494, 94 P. (2d) 180 (1939).
"Jensen v. Cooks' & Waiters' Union, 39 Wash. 531, 81 Pac. 1069 (1905),
4 L. R. A. (N. s.) 302 (1906); St. Germain v. Bakery & Confectionery Work-
ers' Union No. 9, 97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac. 665, L. R. A. 1917F 824 (1917);
Baasch v. Cooks' Union Local No. 33, 99 Wash. 378, 169 Pac. 843 (1918);
Danz v. American Federation of Musicians. 133 Wash. 186, 233 Pac. 630
(1925).
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tions.27 The change in position from the attitude of our court shown in
the cases cited2" is based upon an expression of policy by our legislature
in the 1933 Act, and the opinion cites numerous cases from many juris-
dictions to support this position under an act such as ours. The case
is particularly interesting in another respect as well, since the appellant
here was not an employee of the picketed employer, yet an ordinance
prohibiting hirf from picketing was declared unconstitutional.
By way of summary, we find the following positions to be the govern-
ing ones in this state as of this date: 1. The 1933 Act is not applicable
to cases in which picketing is done by non-employees. 2. The 1933 Act
is unconstitutional insofar as it interferes with equity jurisdiction.
3. Peaceful picketing per se is legal, even if by a non-employee.
We may imply, however, that our court may be relaxing its position
in the matter of nullifying the effectiveness of the 1933 Act, since the
opinion in the case of Yakima v. Gorham indicates that the non-em-
ployee picketer does have a right to picket, and it is possible that when
the next injunction case involving non-employee picketers presents itself
to the court, it will fall into line with other jurisdictions, and will include
non-employee cases within the term "labor dispute". Furthermore, the
way in which the declaration of unconstitutionality laid down in the
Blanchard case has been ignored in the recent cases would lead one
to believe that our court has decided to overlook its former opinion,
and that the 1933 Act is to be enforced when the court is confronted
with factual situations to which the court feels the act was intended
to apply.
JACK H. JAFFE.
"Adams v. Local No. 400 Cooks' & Waiters' & Waitresses' Union of Spo-
kane, 124 Wash. 564, 215 Pac. 19 (1923) (100-foot limit); Sterling Chain
Theaters, Inc. v. Central Labor Council of Seattle, 155 Wash. 217, 283 Pac.
1081 (1930) (re-established 100-foot limit).
"Comment (1930) 5 WASH. L. Rv. 126 gives an excellent summary of
litigation and legislation in this field up to 1930 in this state.
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